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V 
A Re-examination of the 'Death of Art' 
Interpretation of Hegel's Aesthetics 
by 
CURTIS L. CARTER 
There was a time in our very recent past when we were told that 
all-encompassing theories of art were unfruitful. But losing one's 
perspective in the rich field of particularity in art, or in a narrow ana-
lytical focus on art concepts, will no more produce significant under-
standing than will arid theories apart from experiencing the qualities 
of individual art works. It is possible to retain the insights of both ap-
proaches, into particular works with their distinctive qualities and into 
the analysis of art concepts, by not treating the two activities as ends in 
themselves. In the philosophy of art there is a need to take up 'once 
again the grand scheme that relates art to other aspects of human ex-
perience, and connects to a study of art concepts, insights derived from 
attending to particular works. 
What better way to do this than to re-examine the grandest of the 
grand schemes for a philosophy of art? There is good reason to regard 
Hegel's philosophy of art as a means to overcome deficiencies found in 
the two approaches considered above. It relates art to other aspects of 
human experience, nature, culture, and to the world order. At the 
same time Hegel's philosophy of art emerges from his own extensive 
acquaintance with the arts. The possibility that his approach to art ful-
fills the need to relate the particular perceptions and analysis of con-
cepts to each other in the wider scope of human experience is quite 
strong. There is no doubt that Hegel provides one of the richest ac-
counts of art given by any philosopher. Yet, there exists a formidable 
obstacle to the appreciation of his aesthetics. The dominant trend has 
been to interpret Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics and his other materials 
on art as signifying the" death of art," or the view that art as a signific-
ant human activity reaches its end with the dissolution of romantic art. 
Erich Heller's statement is representative: 
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Both Hegel's Classical and Romantic art emerge from his 
metaphysics as sentenced to death by the very law of the Spirit. 
Classical art had to die because the Spirit could not abide by the 
perfect understanding it had reached with concrete reality; for it lies 
in the Spirit's true nature that in the end it should be rid of all sensu-
ous encumbrance .... Romantic art is the negation of the very idea of 
art ... as the body of the Idea. 1 
The view is shared by Croce, Israel Knox, and others who have consid-
ered the question less carefully: 
The German refused to evade the logical exigencies of his system 
and proclaimed the mortality, nay the very death, of art. ... He 
passes in review the successive forms of art, shows the progressive 
steps of internal consumption and lays the whole in its grave, leaving 
philosophy to write its epitaph.2 
By a process of sheer dialectical deduction Hegel infers the death of 
art; it is necessitated by the conceptual determinism of his 
metaphysical dialectical absolutism.3 
Even those who have indicated their lack of support for the prevailing 
interpretation - Bosanquet, D'Hondt, Findlay, and Harries- have not 
offered an adequate examination of the inadequacy of the view that 
Hegel intends to signal the death of art. Bosanquet argues that Croce 
misunderstands Hegel's logic and mistranslates the term 'AufIosung' 
as 'death of art'; he thereby agrees with my position that Croce errs in 
attributing the death of art thesis to Hegel. 4 And these words of pro-
fessor D'Hondt affirm a similar conclusion: "Hegel a-t-il annonce la 
mort de l'art? Impossible de lui imputer un tel crime .... II 
n'emploie jamais ces mots, la mort de I'art, et il lui arrive d'exprimer 
des opinions qui contredisent cette pensee funebre."5 Professor Harries 
also agrees that Hegel should not be interpreted as proclaiming the 
death of art; but Harries does accept a weaker version of the death of 
art thesis when he claims that for Hegel art has lost its highest voca-
tion and asserts that art is in a position to offer the modern world no 
more than a diversion. 6 Finally, it is surely significant that so notable 
an interpreter of Hegel as Professor Findlay makes no mention of "the 
death of art" in his own account of Hegel's view of art. 7 
The paper will develop further the notion that the death of art in-
terpretation is unwarranted by critically examining the arguments of 
Heller, Croce, and Knox, with reference to the Lectures on Aesthetics and 
J 
A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE 'DEATH OF ART' 85 
Hegel's other writings on art. The analysis of crucial texts will result 
in support for the alternative thesis that Hegel did not intend the 
death of art and that he explicitly and implicitly provides for the con-
tinuation and development of art. He explicitly provides for the con-
tinuation of art through its participation in the more inclusive ac-
counts of Absolute Spirit offered by religion and philosophy, which are 
the other two modes of Absolute Spirit. Additionally, Hegel's aesthe-
tics implicitly liberates art from its past forms and from a narrow con-
struing of content. Art is thus free to develop new forms in the light of 
future creative activity of individual artists acting in relation to the 
cultures of their times. 
The very richness and complexity of Hegel's discussion of art, not to 
mention the relation of the material on art to the larger themes of 
Hegel's system, make hazardous any attempt to give a final reading of 
Hegel's view on the place and future of art. The same richness suggests 
a many-sided gem that cannot be examined sufficiently from a single 
perspective. My primary objective here is not to refute conclusively the 
death of art interpretation but to set forth the problem in a form that 
will generate further discussion and rethinking that will lead to clarifi-
cation of an important aspect of Hegel's philosophy of art. The paper 
will develop the following points: (1) The claim that Hegel's 
metaphysical dialectical principle necessarily produces the death of art 
is shown to be based on a misapplication of the principle of the dialec-
tic. (2) A review of the texts most likely to support the death of art 
thesis establishes sufficient qualifications in every case to support an 
alternative interpretation of the texts. (3) The death of art thesis mis-
understands the dissolution in romantic art of subjective and sensuous 
elements and confuses changes in romantic art with the demise of all 
art. 
I. Misapplications of the Principles of Dialectic 
. Characteristic of the death of art interpretation are applications of 
the principle of dialectic or development which are in one way or 
another hostile to the welfare of art. Dialectic can be applied to Hegel's 
view of art at two levels. It is applied to the relation between art, reli-
gion, and philosophy, which are the three modes of disclosing Abso-
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lute Spirit to man's consciousness. Art is understood to be Spirit's 
"sensuous manifestation." Religion and philosophy are more "ideal" 
and more inclusive representations which come closer to the true qual-
ities of Spirit. 8 (HA, 10 1-105) Dialectic also operates in reference to 
the states of the idea of art: symbolic, classical, and romantic. 
Croce, Heller, and Knox base their argument for the death of art in-
terpretation on a mechanical view of the role of dialectic. According to 
their interpretation, the death of art is a necessary logical consequence 
of the dialectical unfolding of Absolute Spirit. As the dialectic unfolds 
at this level we find that beauty in art is a synthesis of the sensuous and 
the rational, romantic art is a synthesis of symbolic and classical art, 
and philosophy is a synthesis of art and religion. 9 Art's demise is pro-
jected on two levels. The appearance of philosophy as the most com-
plete and definitive presentation of Absolute Spirit is understood to 
dispense with the need for art. Analogously, on another level the 
dialectic manifests itself in the symbolic, classical, and romantic forms 
of art. These successive forms are said to "pass in review" until art 
reaches its outer limits as a viable expression of Absolute Spirit, thus 
drawing to a close the life of art. 10 
A. The dialectic applied to art, religion, and philosophy 
The first line of criticism of the death of art thesis can be made with 
respect to dialectical development in the progression from art to phi-
losophy. It will be necessary to give a brief explanation of Hegel's view 
on this point to see where the death of art thesis has gone wrong. The 
thesis is problematic because it presumes that an advancement in the 
stages of dialectic evolution from art to philosophy results in the an-
nihilation or uselessness of the previous stages. This view is in conflict 
with Hegel's explanation of the dialectic. Hegel describes the stages of 
the dialectic in his Preface to The Phenomenology of Mind as equally 
necessary moments of an organic unity that constitute the life of the 
whole. Hyppolite and other distinguished commentators on Hegel's 
system have proposed that the stages in Hegel's dialectic move to ever 
richer developments and "always reproduce within themselves the 
prior developments and give them new meaning."ll I shall adopt this 
interpretation of Hegel's dialectic because it represents Hegel's general 
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philosophical method and because it is in fact the method that he uses 
to discuss both the relations between art, religion, and philosophy and 
the various stages in the development of art. 
Hegel does distinguish the points of view of the artist and the 
philosopher, and he clearly differentiates art from philosophy. The ar-
tist's task is to grasp reality and its forms through alert eyes and ears. 
Although reason acts to enable the artist to relate his perceptions to the 
idea of Absolute Spirit, the artist does not comprehend experience in 
propositions and representations (Satze und Vorstellungen) as does the 
philosopher. Rather, the artist brings to consciousness the inner core of 
reason clothed in concrete forms and the individualities of real life. His 
representations are so infused with the stamp of emotional life that 
they make public a part of the artist's own spiritual personality. 12 
(HA, 281-82) Art is thereby capable only of presenting those aspects 
of the Absolute which can be expressed in sensuous form. By contrast, 
the point of view of philosophy is that of the whole, the absolute, God. 
Philosophy or thought is the mode of apprehension in which both sub-
ject and form are identical. Philosophy is thus the self-reflection of 
Absolute Spirit. 13 (HA, 101, 105) The model that is suggested is in-
carnation - in philosophy we have the disclosing of God as he knows 
himself-and the point of view of philosophy thereby becomes the 
most inclusive account of being. 14 
There is no doubt then that Hegel assigns philosophy, understood 
in the above sense, a higher place than art as a manifestation of Abso-
lute Spirit. (HA, 10-11) In the Phenomenology art is placed very high 
but not at the highest stage of the dialectical development. Hegel as-
signs philosophy a higher place than art in his Aesthetics too. Art ranks 
highest in neither form nor content, and Hegel's choice of philosophy 
as the more inclusive mode of Spirit suggests his preference. 15 But 
none of these facts warrant the conclusion of Knox and the others that 
Hegel pronounces the death of art. Hegel's concept of philosophy in-
corporates art into its more comprehensive grasp of things. Both art and 
religion are united (vereinigt) in philosophy where their characteristics 
are related to the form and subjectivity of thought. Art is neither lost 
nor abandoned in the more comprehensive synthesis of philosophy, but 
continues to function as a vital part of the larger unity. The expression 
of the Absolute in relation to dialectic and philosophy would be in-
complete without the continued participation of art as one of the ele-
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ments of the whole. 16 There is no need to think of destruction of pre-
vious modes, art and religion, because it is characteristic of dialectic 
that the higher mode integrates the content of lower ones as aspects of 
a wider scope where the previous categories can exist without con-
tradiction. 17 At the same time, the' significance of the previous 
categories is retained. 
B. The Dialectic in Symbolic, Classical, Romantic Forms of Art 
The manifestation of dialectic in symbolic, classical, and romantic 
art forms is another part of the argument for the death of art thesis. 
Knox states that romantic art is a consuming synthesis of the other two 
forms, and Heller describes the romantic form as the disintegration of 
art itself. Its demise is thus offered as evidence for the death of art 
thesis. A brief examination of Hegel's discussion of these forms is 
necessary to show that support for the death of art thesis is lacking here 
too. 
Each of the forms is effective in some degree as a representation of 
Absolute Spirit. Symbolic art, the first, is closest to nature. The sen-
suous element in art and Absolute Spirit 'are brought into proximity at 
this level, but they are unable to achieve a unification of the sensuous 
form and spiritual content of art. 18 (HA, 655) The earliest forms of 
symbolic art, being close to nature, exhibit the principle of the pro-
ductive energy of generation. 19 (HA, 641) Phallus and Lingam are 
examples of organic shapes used in symbolic art. They appear as pillars 
and columns constructed in the shapes of male and female sex organs. 
These can be seen in the early pre-architectural and architectural forms 
in the arts of Syria, India, and Egypt. The height of symbolic art 
comes in architectural structures such as the pyramids which in part 
abandon the shapes of nature for shapes that derive from .the artistic 
powers of man's mind. The pyramids, unlike structures which merely 
satisfy the physical want of shelter, act as religious and political sym-
bols. 20 (HA, 653, 655) Despite its degree of success, symbolic art 
lacks both the form and the adequate grasp of Spirit as its content that 
is found in later developments in art. 
Classical art advances the development. Its sculpture takes its pre-
ferred model from the human body. Unlike the other natural animal 
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bodies whose bodily frames are animated by animal soul (Seele), the 
human form also has a quality of spirit (Geist). 21 (HA, 714-15) Spirit 
is explained here as "being for itself of conscious and self-conscious ex-
istence," together with the emotions, ideas, and purposes of that exis-
tence. The universal qualities of the human form are ideally receptive 
to a unity of form and content by which Spirit enters into the sensuous 
form of the sculpture, analogous to the receptivity of the human body 
to Spirit. However the unity of classical art bypasses the genuinely 
subjective aspects of personal self-consciousness and is found to be un-
stable. 22 (HA, 716-18) The result is the dissolution of the objective 
unity of the classical form of art. 
The emergence of romantiC art introduces the last of Hegel's deter-
minate forms of art. A careful understanding of Hegel's view of the 
romantic form of art is very important to the clarification of the death 
of art issue. Advocates of the death of art thesis emphasize two themes 
arising from romantic art. They assert that romantic art consumes the 
previous forms of art through the workings of dialectic and then point 
to the alleged disengagement of inner subjective aspects from ,outer 
sensuous form as the definitive evidence for the death of art. But I will 
show that the synthesis of the previous forms of art into romantic art 
and the changed relation of the subjective and sensuous elements that 
Hegel finds in romantic art do not entail the death of art. Croce and 
the others who interpret Hegel's aesthetics according to the death of 
art hypothesis fail to see that synthesis in romantic art includes the 
previously independent forms without destroying them. The changed 
relation of sensuous and subjective elements in romantic art, moreover, 
is not synonymous with art's demise. 
1. Synthesis in Romantic Art 
The romantic arts of painting, music, and poetry each provide some 
synthesis of the previous forms of art. Painting takes representations of 
environments from architecture and uses them as background settings 
for the human figure which it borrows from sculpture. (HA, 797f) 
Poetry then combines "essential qualities" of painting and music to 
embrace the most inclusive perspective of the arts. Hegel's remarks on 
dramatic poetry offer another example of the dialectic synthesis in a 
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particular romantic art. There, the synthesis shows the "lesser arts 
-architecture, sculpture, painting, and music-appearing as vital 
parts in a theater presentation of dramatic poetry.23 (HA, l18lf and 
1190) Shakespeare's "Hamlet" and Mozart's "Magic Flute," each in its 
own way, illustrates the synthesis by its use of the lesser arts in the 
total "poetry" of a dramatic performance. 
According to the death of art thesis, we should expect the workings 
of dialectic to produce the destruction of the lesser and prior stages of 
art. But quite a different effect is seen. These representative samples of 
dialectic synthesis taken from Hegel's discussion of romantic arts show 
that the lesser arts, or principles derived from them, are retained and 
used in the context of a larger purpose. On the other hand, neither 
example suggests any use of these arts that would result in their cancel-
lation apart from the synthesis. Nothing in the painter's use of princi-
ples borrowed from architecture and sculpture makes painting an 
adequate replacement of these two arts. And likewise the use of music 
in a drama does no violence to its status as music. The examination of 
dialectic in romantic art thus fails to support the death of art thesis; in-
stead, it reinforces the previous point that dialectic incorporates rather 
than destroys earlier stages of its development. 
2. The Changed Relation of Sensuous Form and the Subjective in 
Romantic Art 
The development of romantic art signifies a shift of emphasis from 
the sensuous or visible form and its relation to Absolute Spirit to self-
conscious subjectivity-the inner world of the ideal and of emotions, 
soul, and contemplation, of the subject. (HA, 792-96) Personal sub-
jectivity and its involvement with Absolute Spirit are the main center 
of interest for this changed point of view. This shift has been under-
stood by the advocates of the death of art thesis as an irrevocable split 
between two essential elements of art, resulting in art's permanent dis-
solution. However, an examination of Hegel's discussion of this point 
suggests that too great an emphasis has been placed on the alleged dis-
engagement of sense and subjectivity. Hegel is partly to blame, for his 
language at times does appear to suggest such a reading. Yet careful at-
tention to the full context of the discussion shows Hegel repeatedly 
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reminding the reader of the continuing necessity for a vital relation be-
tween the sensuous and the subjective in art. (HA, 795) 
Admittedly, there is less attention given by Hegel to the positive 
role of the sensuous element in romantic art. But the shift has a differ-
ent purpose than to bring to an end the life of art. The shift is wrought 
in part to emphasize the differences between classical and romantic art. 
Hegel finds too little involvement of personal subjective life in classi-
cal art. By comparison, romantic art satisfies this lack. Hegel thus 
gives prominence to the subjective by de-emphasizing the visible. But 
this does not mean that romantic art can exist apart from its sensuous 
form. Romantic art is compelled to operate in the realms of the visible 
and the sensible (Sichbaren und Sinnlichen) to communicate the de-
velopments of inner life. 24 (HA, 795f) 
The need to communicate the inner workings of imagination 
suggests another way of looking at the changed role of sensuous form 
in romantic art. In classical art the visible form acts as a symbol par-
ticipating as fully as possible in the ontological meaning of Absolute 
Spirit. But the visible form in romantic art acts more as a sign,' com-
municating the artistic happenings of subjective life without being the 
main center of interest. (HA, 795f) The distinction between symbol 
and sign could be misleading here. It should not be understood to 
mean simply that the visible has no significance. Hegel is attempting 
to show that the significance of the visible is not due to its natural sen-
suous qualities but comes instead from the fact that imagination sub-
jects the natural qualities to its own subjective purposes and thus 
transforms the qualities of a medium into art. 25 
II. Discussion of Particular Texts 
Even those who agree with the first point, that the dialectic argu-
ment fails to support the death of art thesis, may puzzle over certain of 
Hegel's texts that are cited in support of the thesis. The following in-
terpretation of three principal texts will suggest that they do not 
necessarily uphold the thesis. The texts are taken from representative 
major divisions of Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics, one each corresponding 
to the general idea of a philosophy of art, to a particular form of art, 
and to a particular medium. The first concerns Hegel's justification for 
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a philosophy of art and the limits and place of art relative to religion and 
philosophy; the second considers the nature and implications of the 
dissolution of the romantic form of art; and the third concerns the role 
of sensuous or external form in poetry. All three bear directly and criti-
cally on the acceptance or rejection of the death of art thesis. 
A. "Art is and remains for us, on the side of its highest 
possibilities, a thing of the past." (HA, 11) 26 
The larger context of the quotation is the introduction to the Lectures 
on Aesthetics where Hegel justifies the need for a philosophy of art. 
Since the statement is a part of his rationale for writing a philosophy of 
art, it necessarily takes on a function of apology or justification. It 
shows in part why Hegel is doing philosophy rather than making 
paintings or poems. More importantly, the statement expresses the 
larger need for a form of thought to accommodate the deficiencies that 
he sees in the art of his own age and culture. The statement expresses 
Hegel's belief that the critical and reflective activities of his own age 
are not conducive to the creation of significant art; but it should not be 
taken as a definitive pronouncement on the future of art for all ages. 
Here I agree with Gray's point that the emphasis in the passage under 
consideration is on the "for us," and that art will "in the evolution of 
ages" continue to awaken man to self-knowledge and truth. 27 
The immediate context of the quotation is a preliminary account of 
the reasons for making philosophy the supreme approach to Absolute 
Spirit. According to Hegel, art is one, but not the only, and not neces-
sarily the most adequate expression of man's highest concerns. It is 
important for the argument of this paper to note that the limitations 
placed on art by Hegel are quite specific, rather than general or all-
inclusive ones. The limits are in terms of seeing art as the highest ap-
proach to the ultimate truths of the religious point of view of Hegel's 
time, or of Hegel's own Christian religious point of view. He finds art 
insufficient to bring the "true interests of our spiritual life to· con-
sciousness," and "no longer able to discover that satisfaction of 
spiritual wants, which previous epochs and nations have ... exclu-
sively found in it," e.g., the good days of Greek art and the golden 
time of the later Middle Ages. 28 (HA, 9-10) Though art, in Hegel's 
view, is not as adequate as religion or philosophy for satisfying man's 
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spiritual wants, art nevertheless retains. its place as a highly valued ac-
tivity, both for Hegel and for the future. Here and elsewhere the limi-
tations of art are stated in relative and qualified terms. 
Finally, it is a part of a much larger aspect of Hegel interpretation to 
decide whether the forward progress of the dialectic is a process in 
time. 29 In the Phenomenology, the dialectic is, in part, in time, and the 
moments in the history of a particular civilization are the movements 
of the dialectic. Hegel wants to speak in such a way that what he says 
applies to such moments as when religion or art or philosophy is the 
dominant voice in a particular historical period, say ancient Greece or 
modern Germany. But he doesn't necessarily want his categories of art, 
religion, and philosophy to be tied to these particular phenomena in 
history. Hegel is also timelessly locating art relative to its place in the 
total assortment of human values rather than asserting that art is dead 
because still higher values rise above it, e.g., philosophy or absolute 
knowledge. (HA, 82-90) 
Along the same lines, Hegel sees the dialectic manifesting itself in 
such particular stylistic moments as the classical style of ahcient 
Greece and the romantic style of nineteenth century Germany. But he 
does"not restrict the symbolic, classical, and romantic modes of art to a 
determined progress of the dialectic in time. These modes are timeless, 
universal forms of art. They, and possibly others that have yet to 
emerge, are necessary to provide a view of art in all of its aspects and to 
show its relation to the whole, which is, for Hegel, the true. 
B. "We find . .. as the termination of romantic art, the 
contingency of the exterior condition and internalliJe, and a 
falling asunder of the two aspects, by reason of which art commits 
an act of suicide . ... ,,30 
The second text to be considered occurs in a discussion of the disso-
lution of romantic art. In this context, Hegel speaks of a "falling asun-
der" (Auseinander/allen) of the sensuous and the subjective elements of 
romantic art, with the result that art allegedly dissolves itself in the 
process (selbst sich aufhebt). Dissolution is inferpreted by advocates of 
the death of art thesis to mean the death or demise of art. And this in-
terpretation has been a part of the basis for the support of the thesis. 
L 
94 ART AND LOGIC IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY 
Osmaston's translation of the phrase, "Kunst selbst sich aufhebt," into 
the English, "Art commits an act of suicide," may have inadvertently 
served to perpetuate the death of art interpretation, especially among 
English readers of Hegel. However, insofar as I can determine, Hegel 
never actually uses the phrase, "the death of art." Osmaston's transla-
tion is suggestive only in its fanciful and misleading character. Hegel's 
text neither benefits from nor requires translation in a manner suggest-
ing the suicide image. The translator ignores the fact that in aufheben 
he has one of Hegel's most enigmatic terms. One of the most impor-
tant notions in all of Hegel, aufheben literally means to raise up some-
thing; however, as a philosophical notion it can mean "cancel," "dis-
solve," or "preserve," or all three at once! Hegel may have resorted to a 
certain amount of punstering to convey the essence of his dialectical 
method of interpreting the sensuous and the subjective elements of art. 
Nevertheless aufheben with its multiple connotations assembles the 
several aspects of the dialectic process with admirable verbal economy. 
I would like to propose an alternative to Osmaston's translation of 
aufheben based on the idea of dissolve. 'Dissolve' includes both the ele-
ments of "cancel" and "preserve," and it expresses the appropriate 
meanings of both Auseinander/allen and selbst sich aufhebt which are the 
principal terms in the text that is under consideration here. In this 
case, to dissolve is not the same as to destroy. The dissolution in 
romantic art is more akin to the modern cinematic principles of dis-
solve. In a film, to dissolve is to fade out one shot or scene while 
simultaneously fading in the next, overlapping the two during the 
process. 31 The camera focuses on an object that dissolves in degrees 
into a near blur, only to re-emerge as a distinctly new object that re-
tains some of the qualities of the object it has replaced. 
The analogous process of "dissolve" in romantic art takes place on 
the level of the relation of visible sensuous form to the inner subjective 
workings of imagination. Natural qualities of sensuous form "dis-
solve" into a new image as they are transformed by the qualities and 
activities of subjective imagination. In the new image, the natural 
qualities are retained but are "in the service of' the artist's spirit, feel-
ings, and ideas. 
The results of my application of the principle of dissolve are visible 
in a comparison of a Greek "Bust of Zeus" with Rembrandt's "Portrait 
of a Young Man, 1662. "32 The bust acts as an ideal vehicle for reveal-
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ing Absolute Spirit to man's consciousn~ss, according to Hegel's cate-
gory of classical art. Its universal qualities of sensuous form are 
abstracted from the human form, but they retain their independence 
from personal subjectivity and also from complete unity with Absolute 
Spirit. By comparison, Rembrandt's portrait shows the dissolve of the 
natural sensuous qualities of color and line into a new image. They re-
veal the human qualities of a sensitive, fragile personality who is 
enigmatic in his very lack of a distinct focus. The viewer is aware of the 
painting's rich sensuous qualities primarily through their disclosure of 
the particular qualities of the subject's inner life. 
A similar effect occurs in two different pictorial scenes. Monet's 
"Charing Cross Bridge, 1903" shows sensuous form in the relative ab-
sence of its domination by subjective purposes. Monet arranges color 
and light in a manner of scientific objectivity and shows the surfaces of 
both the painting and its representation of the scene primarily for their 
sensory values. Consider also Don!'s "Loch Lomond, 1875." Compared 
to Monet's "Charing Cross Bridge," "Loch Lomond" displays a strong 
sense of the artist's subjective vision of the nature scene. Colors and 
lines are no less present in the Dore painting, but they do not project 
their sensory values independently of displaying the artist's vision of an 
aura of mystery and legend. 
The differences in both sets of examples are between art works that 
show the sensuous qualities retaining a high degree of independence 
and exhibiting forms that are simply extensions of the natural qual-
ities, and works where the artist's subjective spirit dissolves the sensu-
ous in a more personal representation. The sensuous element is not lost 
or abandoned. It simply becomes more evidently a vehicle to express 
man's inner life. If I have correctly interpreted the text referred to 
here, those who understand romantic art to be the death of art misun-
derstand Hegel's view. Romantic art is not the death of art; it is one 
more stage, and obviously is not the last stage in the history of art. 
C. "Poetry, alone among the arts, completely dispenses with the 
sensuous medium of the objective world of phenomena. "33 
The third text is in reference to poetry. Its several variations, appear-
ing throughout Hegel's long discussion of poetry, all suggest that 
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poetry is the most successful of the arts in moulding bare sensuous 
form to the aims of subjectivity. Advocates of the death of art thesis at-
tempt· to use such passages to support their view. However, the 
strength of their argument diminishes when we examine the qualifica-
tions and limits that Hegel acknowledges, and when we apply the 
principle of dissolve to poetry. 
Hegel identifies two principal ways in which poetry is superior to 
the other arts: in its representational powers and in its greater success 
at moulding sensuous form to the aims of subjectivity. (HA, 960, 966) 
Only the latter is important for the death of art thesis because superior-
ity in representational powers does not suggest the dissolution of art. 
The references to the superiority of poetry are expressed negatively by 
Hegel and are overstated in order to contrast poetry with the other 
arts. However, for each statement emphasizing poetry's dispensing 
with the sensuous materials, there are important qualifications that are 
applicable to one or all. 34 Hegel continues to remind us of the neces-
sary qualifications leading to a correct sense of the negative overstate-
ments. 
A most important qualification arises from the necessity to com-
municate the results of the inner imaginative activity. Sensuous form 
remains essential for poetic communication as it does for the other arts. 
It is not seen as bare matter; instead it acts as a sign that is able to 
transmit the qualities of emotion and idea. The communication is pos-
sible because sensuous form is transformed and elevated through the 
activity of imagination. 
A second qualification is with respect to changes in the natural ma-
terials of the different arts. When Hegel states that poetry ~ill have 
nothing to do with gross matter as such, he is simply indicating the 
difference between the external materials of architecture and poetry. 
(HA, 960) In architecture the artist struggles with nature's raw mate-
rials of wood and stone. By the time art reaches the stage of poetry, its 
external "raw material" is language. Because language is already a 
product of mind, it requires less "working over" than do the materials 
of architecture. However, it remains that language is both thought and 
human speech or inscription, and poetry necessarily retains a sensuous 
form. 
Hegel's understanding of the sensuous element in poetry can be seen 
clearly in examples of English romantic poetry. The English romantic 
theory of imagination, as it is discussed in nineteenth and twentieth 
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century literary criticism, closely parallels Hegel's view. Analogous to 
Hegel's idea of dissolve, imagination acts in English romantic poetry 
to dissolve the oppositions of emotions and ideas to the sensory ele-
ments. Coleridge speaks of the "indissoluble union between the intel-
lectual and the material world" in these words: 
The Poet's heart and intellect should be combined, intimately ... 
and unified with the great appearances of nature, and not merely 
held in solution and loose mixture with them. 35 
The distinction between undissolved sensory material in art and the 
successfully dissolved can be seen in a contrast of sonnets with the same 
theme by William Lisle Bowles and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. 36 The 
first is Bowles' "To The River Itchin." 
Itch in, when I behold thy banks again, 
Thy crumbling margin, and thy silver breast, 
On which the self-same tints still seem to rest, 
Why feels my heart the shiv'ring sense of pain? 
Is it-that many a summer's day has past 
Since, in life's morn, I carol'd on thy side? 
Is it-that oft, since then my heart has sigh'd, 
As Youth, and Hope's delusive gleams, flew fast? 
Is it-that those, who circled on thy shore, 
Companions of my youth, now meet no more? 
Whate'er the cause, upon thy banks I bend 
Sorrowing, yet feel such solace at my heart, 
As at the meeting of some long-lost friend, 
From whom, in happier hours, we wept to part. 
The second is Coleridge's "To The River Otter." 
Dear native Brook! wild Streamlet of the West! 
How many various-fated years have past, 
What happy and what mournful hours, since last 
I skimmed the smooth thin stone along thy breast, 
Numbering its light leaps! yet so deep imprest 
Sink the sweet scenes of childhood, that mine eyes 
I never shut amid the sunny ray, 
But straight with all their tints thy waters rise, 
Thy crossing plank, thy marge with willows grey, 
And bedded sand that veined with various dyes 
Gleamed through thy bright transparence! On my way, 
Visions of Childhood l oft have ye beguiled 
Lone manhood's cares, yet waking fondest sighs: 
Ah! that once more I were a careless Child! 
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Coleridge's poem is admittedly done in imitation of Bowles', and 
both deal with the theme of recollecting a childhood experience which 
is no longer vital. Yet, their differences exemplify an important dis-
tinction. Bowles simply sets up an associative relation between emo-
tion and the sensuous elements of the poem. The sensuous is not inte-
grally connected with the emotion. Compared to Bowles' poem, Col-
eridge's intensifies the color of sensibility with emotion and idea, giv-
ing a richness of significance that signals a fusion of ideas and emotions 
with sensuous material. 37 The poet's imagination transforms the ex-
perience of nature into feeling or thought-infused lines, and brings 
them under the dominion of subjective spirit. Instead of the death of 
art, I find that the role of the sensory form is changed in accordance 
with the purposes of romantic art. 
Conclusion 
My conclusion is that Hegel did not intend the death of art. He uses 
the principle of dialectic to show the limits of art for communicating 
the highest religious truths of interest to man. The dialectic also shows 
the respective differences among the symbolic, classical, and romantic 
forms of art and gives a basis for comparing them according to their 
common use of sensuous and subjective elements. The sensuous and 
the subjective elements fall apart in romantic art only in a metaphori-
cal way of speaking, and only to dissolve into a new image that makes 
the subjective element more prominent for this form of art. The texts 
that allegedly support the death of art thesis are less puzzling when the 
interpreter is mindful of their respective purposes of (1) justifying phi-
losophy of art; (2) defining art's place and limits in relation to other 
modes of cognition; (3) contrasting and comparing the different forms 
of art. In effect, the aggregate force of the arguments offered here - the 
analysis of dialectic in Hegel's aesthetics, the examination of three 
principal texts, and the interpretation of dissolution in romantic 
art - recommends an interpretation that includes a future for art and 
warrants abandonment of the negative thesis of Croce, Heller, and Is-
rael Knox. 
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